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ITHE LESSON OF RICARDIANISM
It is now almost a century since John Stuart Mill's great work
on the Principles of Political Economy appeared. In this trea-
tise Mill rounded out and summed up the classical system of
which Ricardo had been the leading architect. Mill wrote with
dignity, assurance, and authority. His mind was not beset by
doubts concerning the true principles of political economy. "The
most important propositioninpolitical economy", he pro-
claimed, "is the law of production from the land, that in any
given state of agricultural skill and knowledge, by increasing
the labour, the produce is not increased in an equal degree."
In Mill's world, diminishing returns defined the production
function in agriculture and thus set the stage within which
economic progress could unfold. Population and technology
were the dynamic factors in economic life, but population was
considered the more potent variable. As population increased,
the land already being farmed would need to be cultivated
more intensively or inferior land brought under the plow; costs
on the margin of cultivation consequently would rise, and serve
ultimately to enrich the landlords and injure the capitalists and
workers. "It is vain to say", Mill lamented, "that all mouths
which the increase of mankind calls into existence, bring with
them hands. The new mouths require as much food as the old
ones, and the hands do not produce as much."*
If these doctrines of the classical school make curious reading
today, our perspective has been altered by the emergence of
new problems and a century of experience with the old ones.
From the vantage point of history, we know that the Ricardi-
ans vastly overestimated the dynamic pressure of population
•J. S. Mill, Prindples (Ashley edition), pp. 177, 191.
3and underestimated the power of technology. We know that
the static tendency of land to yield a diminishing return to
successive increments of labor has been swamped by the his-
torical tendency toward improvement in the industrial arts.
Between 1870 and 1940 we have tolerably reliable measure-
ments, and they show that the output of American agriculture
increased much faster than employment, decade after decade.
At the end of the seventy-year period employment was only 34
per cent higher than at the beginning, while output was 279
per cent higher.* Today many are troubled by the mechaniza-
tion of agriculture and the slow growth of population, few are
concerned over the 'law of diminishing returns'. In their study
of American agriculture, published by the National Bureau in
1942, Barger and Landsberg do not even mention the law.
I have taken this excursion into history because we are living
in a time of bold and vigorous theoretical speculation, the only
close parallel of which isthe Ricardian age. The principal
practical problem of Ricardo's generation was whether the
state should foster the economic power of the landlords or of
the rising manufacturing class. The heated discussions of this
question stimulated Ricardo to take the distribution of incomes
as the principal problem of economic theory, and he thereby
set the pattern of classical economics. The principal practical
problem of our own generation is unemployment, and it has
now become—•asitlong should have been—the principal
problem of economic theory. This transformation of economic
theory is due in large part to the writings of John Maynard
Keynes, which are exercising a great influence on the thinking
of economists and the shaping of public policies in our own and
other countries. But although Keynes and his followers are
concerned with a range of problems that the classical econo-
mists shunned, by and large they still seek to arrive at eco-
nomic truth in the manner of Ricardo and his followers. Broad-
iy speaking, the Keynesians investigate the volume of employ-
ment and income of a country on much the same plane as the
'Harold Barger and Hans H. Landsberg, American Agriculture, 1899-1939, p. 253.
Of course, these figures exaggerate the disparity, since they take no account of the
shift from direct labor on farms to indirect labor in factories.
4Ricardians investigated the distribution of incomes. If the fate
of the Ricardian system carries a moral, it has not been clear-
iy impressed on this original and able group of economists of
our generation.
IIKEYNES' THEORY OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM
I have said enough to set the theme of my report, which is to
relate the work of the National Bureau to the Keynesian think-
ing of our times. The opinion is widespread that Keynes has
explained what determines the volume of employment at any
given time, and that our knowledge of the causes of varia-
tions in employment is now sufficient to enable governments to
maintain a stable and high level of national income and em-
ployment within the framework of our traditional economic
organization. If this opinion is valid, the solution of the basic
problem of democratic societies is in sight, and the National
Bureau would do well to reconsider its research program. Un-
happily, this opinion reflects a pleasant but dangerous illusion.
The basis for the Keynesians' confidence is Keynes' theory
of underemployment equilibrium, which attempts to show that
a free enterprise economy, unless stimulated by governmental
policies, may sink into a condition of permanent mass unem-
ployment. The crux of theory is that the volume of in-
vestment and the 'propensity to consume' determine between
them a unique level of income and employment. The theory
can be put simply without misrepresenting its essence. Assume
that business firms in the aggregate decide to add during a
given period 2 billion dollars' worth of goods to their
piles, using this convenient term to include new plant and equip-
ment as well as inventories. This then is the planned invest-
ment. Assume, next, that business firms do not plan to retain
any part of their income;* so that if they pay out, say, 18
billion to the public, they expect to recover 16 billion through
the sale of consumer goods, the difference being paid out on
*This assumption is not essential to the Keynesian system; I make it here in order
to simplify the exposition. The figures used throughout are merely illustrative.
Further, the exposition is restricted to the proximate determinants of employment in
Keynes' system; this simplification does not affect the argument that follows.
5account of the expected addition to their stockpiles. Assume,
finally, that the 'consumption function' has a certain definite
shape; that if income payments are, say, 18 billion, the public
will spend 17 billion on consumer goods and save 1, and that
one-half of every additional billion of income will be devoted
to consumption and one-half to savings. Under these conditions,
the national income per 'period' should settle at a level of 20
billion.
The reason is as follows. If income payments were 18 bil-
lion, the public would spend 17 on consumer goods. But the
firms that made these payments expected to sell.16 billions'
worth to the public and to add 2 billions' worth to their stock-
piles; the actual expenditure of 17 billion on consumer goods
would therefore exceed sellers' expectations by1billion, and
stimulate expansion in the consumer goods trades. On the other
hand, if income payments were 22 billion, the public would
spend 19 on consumer goods; this would fall short of sellers'
expectations by 1 billion, and set off a contraction in the output
of consumer goods. In general, if income payments fell below
20 billion, the sales expectations of business firms would be
exceeded; while if income payments rose above 20 billion, the
expectations of business firms would be disappointed. In either
case, forces would be released that would push the system in
the direction of the 20 billion mark. Hence, in the given cir-
cumstances, 20 billion is the equilibrium income, and it may be
concluded that the basic data—that is, the volume of invest-
ment and the consumption function—determine a national in-
come of unique size. If we assume, now, a unique correlation
between income and employment, it follows that the basic data
determine also a unique volume of employment—which may
turn out to be well below 'full' employment.
This is the theoretical skeleton that underlies the Keynesian
system. The theory implies that when unemployment exists, an
increase in consumer spending out of a given income will ex-
pand employment; so too will an increase in private home in-
vestment or in exports, and so again will governmental loan ex-
penditure, its effect on employment being in a sense similar to
that of private investment expenditure. The theory implies also
6that the magnitude of the expansion in employment by any of
these routes is a precisely calculable quantity, since the deter-
minants of employment are alleged to have been isolated. To
get more out of the theory, more specific assumptions must be
made.
At this vital juncture the Keynesians differ somewhat among
themselves, but two institutional assumptions dominate the
thinking of the school. The firstis that consumer outlay is
linked fairly rigidly to national income and is unlikely to ex-
pandunless income expands; in other words, there islittle
reason to expect, at least in the short run, that a condition of
unemployment will be corrected through a reduction in indivi-
dual savings. The second assumption is that investment oppor-
tunities are limited in a 'mature' economy such as our own;
consequently, private investment may continue, year in and
year out, at a level that falls considerably short of what the
community would save if 'full employment' existed. If neither
an upward shift in the consumption function, nor an expansion
of private investment at home, nor an increase in net exports,
can be confidently counted on, it follows that our lot may be
persistent mass unemployment. We may escape the fate of
secular stagnation, however, if the effective demand for em-
ployment is supplemented by governmental spending. Further-
more, this remedy for secular stagnation is also the remedy
for business cycles, since the most that can be expected of
private investment is that it may to generate rise sufficiently
'full employment' during a fleeting boom.
Of late this theory has been refined and elaborated, so that
'deficit financing' need no longer be the key instrument for
coping with unemployment, and I shall refer to one of these
refinements at a later point. But the practical significance of
the modifications of the theory is problematical, and in any
event the theory as I have sketched it still dominates the think-
ing of the Keynesians when they look beyond the transition
from war to peace. The similarity of this theory to the Ricar-
dian model is unmistakable. The most important proposition in
Ricardian economics is that the production function in agricul-
ture has a certain shape, that is, the marginal product dimin-
7ishes as the input of labor increases. The most important pro-
position in Keynesian economics is that the consumption func-
tion has a certain shape, thatis, consumer outlay increases
with national income but by less than the increment of income.
The Ricardians treated the production function as fixed, and
deduced the effects on income distribution of an increase or
opulation, or of a tax or bounty on the production
Keynesians treat the consumption function as fixed,
on the size of the national income of an
private investment, or of an increase or
tal loan expenditure. The Ricardians be-
was the key dynamic variable, and they
of the course of events if that exuberant
s not counteracted. The Keynesians believe that in-
the key dynamic variable, and they draw a gloomy
the course of events if that timid variable is not
governmental loan expenditure. To be sUre, the
Ricardians recognized that the production function in agricul-
ture was subject to change, and they frequently inserted quali-
fications to their main conclusions. The Keynesians likewise
recognize that the consumption function is not absolutely rigid,
and they frequently insert qualificationstotheir main con-
clusions. But I have formed the definite impression that the
Keynesians—except when they discuss changes in personal taxa-
tion—attach even less importance to their qualifications than
did the Ricardians; all of which may merely reflect the fact
thattheRicardianswereconcernedlargelywithsecular
changes, while the Keynesians are mainly concerned, despite
their anxiety over secular stagnation, with comparatively short-
run changes.
There is, of course, nothing unscientific about Ricardianism
as sUch. But ceteris paribus is a slippery tool, and may lead to
serious error if the premises accepted for purposes of reasoning
are contrary to fact, or if the impounded data are correlated
in experience with factors that the theorist allows to vary, or
if the very process of adjustment induces changes in the im-
pounded data. Let us go back to the theoretical skeleton of the
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fortified bythe volume of intended investment is 2 billion dollars, income
payments 20 billion, and consumers' outlay at this level of in-
come 18 billion. On the basis of these data, the economic
system is alleged to be in equilibrium. But the equilibrium is
aggregative, and thisisa mere arithmetic fiction.Business
firms do not have a common pocke.tbook. True, they receive in
the aggregate precisely the sum they had expected, but that
need not mean that even a single firm receives precisely what
it had expected. Since windfall profits and losses are virtually
bound to be dispersed through the system, each firm will ad-
just to its own sales experience, and within a firm the adjust-
ment will vary from one product to another. Under the cir-
cumstances the intended investment cannot—quite apart from
'autonomous' changes—very well remain at 2 billion, and the
propensity to consume is also likely to change. Our data there-
fore do not determine a unique size of national income; what
they rather determine isa movement away from a unique
figure. Of course, we cannot tell the direction or magnitude
of the movement, but that is because the basic data on which
the Keynesian analysis rests are not sufficiently detailed for
the purpose.
I have imagined that Keynes' aggregative equilibriumis
realized from the start. But suppose that this does not happen;
suppose that, in the initial period, the intended investment is
2 billion, income payments 16 billion, and that savings at this
level of income are zero. Will income now gravitate toward
the 20 billion mark, as the theory claims it should? There is
little reason to expect this will happen. In the first place, wind-
fall profits will be unevenly distributed, and the adjustment
of individual firms to their widely varying sales experiences
will induce a change in the aggregate of their intended invest-
ment. In the second place, unemployed resources will exercise
some pressure on the prices of the factors of production, and
here and there tend to stimulate investment. In the third
place, if an expansion in the output of consumer goods does
get under way, it will induce additions to inventories for pure-
ly technical reasons; further, the change in the business out-
look is apt to stimulate the formation of new firms, and to
9induce existing firms to embark on investment undertakings of
a type that have no close relation to recent sales experience.
In the fourth place,as income expands,itsdistributionis
practically certain to be modified; this will affect the propensity
to consume, as will also the emergence of capital gains, the
willingness of consumers to increase purchases on credit, and
the difficulty faced by consumers in adjusting many of their
expenditures to increasing incomes in the short run. These re-
actions, and I have listed only the more obvious ones, are es-
sential parts of the adjustment mechanism of a free enterprise
economy. Under their impact the data with which we started—
namely, the amount of intended investment and the consumption
function—are bound to change, perhaps slightly, perhaps enor-
mously. It is wrong, therefore, to conclude that these data im-
ply or determine, even in the sense of a rough approximation,
a unique. level at which the income and employment of a nation
will tend to settle. In strict logic, the data determine, if any-
thing, some complex cumulative movement, not a movement
toward some fixed position.
If this analysis is sound, the imposing schemes for govern-
mental action that are being bottomed on Keynes' equilibrium
theory must be viewed with scepticism. It does not follow, of
course, that these schemes could not be convincingly defended
on other grounds. But it does follow that the Keynesians lack
a clear analytic foundation for judging how a given fiscal
policy will affect the size of the national income or the volume
of employment. Fiscal policy is now the fashion among econo-
mists, and three fiscal paths to 'full employment' have recently
been delineated. The firstis to increase expenditure but not
taxes. The second is to increase taxes as much as expenditure.
The third is to reduce taxes but leave expenditure unchanged.
The first of these methods—that is, loan expenditure—avoids,
we are told, the excessively large expenditures of the second
method, and the excessive deficits of the third. This is a high-
ly suggestive conclusion, and may have much to recommend it
on practical grounds. But to accept it as an approximation to
scientific truth we must be willing to make assumptions of the
following type:(1)the consumption functionisso shaped
10—
thatthe dollar volume of savings increases as income increases,
(2)the consumption functionis practically invariant except
in response to personal taxation, (3) an increase in taxes will
lower the consumption function considerably but by less than
the addition to taxes, (4) a reduction in taxes will raise the
consumption function but by considerably less than the tax
reduction, (5) the planned savings of business enterprises are
correlated simply and uniquely with income payments,(6)
monopolistic practices of business firms can safely be neglected,
(7) private investment will not be influenced appreciably by
the character of the fiscal policy pursued by government. Al-
though assumptions such as these may be extremely helpful at
a stage in our thinking about an exceedingly complicated prob-
lem, it seems plain that the inferences to which they lead can-
not be regarded as a scientific guide to governmental policies.
IIIISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY THE KEYNESIAN DOCTRINE
During the last decade the world has moved swiftly in a Key-
nesiandirection.Keynes'GeneralTheorycrystallizedthe
despondency of the 'thirties and gave it brilliant intellectual ex-
pression. Then came thewar, and withitunprecedented
government expenditures. The public debt followed suit; but
the curse of unemployment was lifted. This experience
convinced many that democratic governments can, if they only
have the will, readily subdue business depressions. While the
war was still raging, the British government made the epoch-
making announcement that it deemed the maintenance of a
stable and high level of employment a fundamental responsibili-
ty, which it would seek to discharge by varying its own rate of
spending and by such other devices as may keep total national
expenditure steady. Similar policies have been proclaimed in
Canada and Australia. In our own country this policy is being
actively debated. The immediate outcome of the controversy is
uncertain; but itis reasonable to expect that the gap between
our thinking and the British will narrow quickly when ex-
tensive unemployment again develops, and that at leastin
the near-term future we shall seek a solution within the frame-
11work of an individualistic capitalism. For both reasons the
need for authentic knowledge of the causes of unemployment
in rriodern commercial nations is now greater than ever.
The problem of unemployment facing our generation calls
for realistic, thorough, and unceasing investigation. The great
and obvious virtue of the remedies proposed by the Keynesians
is that they seek to relieve mass unemployment; their weak-
ness is that they lean heavily on a speculative analysis of un-
certain value. This weakness attaches also to my critical re-
marks on the theory of underemployment equilibrium. Granted
the simple determinism of Keynesian doctrine is an illu-
sion, it does not follow that secular stagnation is another, or
that the consumption function may not be sufficiently stable in
experience to enable public officials to forecast reliably some
consequences of their policies. These questions raisefactual
issues of the highest importance, which should be faced objective-
ly:they are closely related to investigations that we have
carried out in the past and to investigations that we now
have under way.
In 1938, under a liberal grant from the Falk Foundation,
we undertook a detailed historical study of production and
employment in the United States. This investigation has pushed
statistical measures of output back to 1870 or 1880 for some
major industries, back to about 1900 for others. Whatever
the time range covered, the leading industries of the country
show notable advances, decade after decade, until we reach the
'thirties. There is nothing in this statistical record to suggest
'secular stagnation' before that fateful decade. The story ap-
pears dramatically in the statistics of manufacturing produc-
tion. Output rose 58 per cent from 1899 to 1909, 41 per
cent from 1909 to 1919, 64 per cent from 1919 to 1929. In
the next decade these remarkable advances came to an abrupt
stop; output increased a mere 3 per cent, whereas population
rose 7.5 per cent.* Estimates of the flow of goods, which Kuz-
nets and Shaw have traced back to about 1870, repeat Fabri-
cant's story for manufacturing: substantial growth decade after
decade, then virtual standstill in the 'thirties. Data on employ-
*For the sources of the figures cited in this section, see the Appendix.
12ment and unemployment are less reliable and do not go back
as far as data on output. But they too give no hint of stagna-
tion until the 'thirties, when everything seemed to change: un-
employment, which amounted to 1.5 million in 1929, reached
nearly 9 million in 1939.
All this, of course, is generally known, as is also the chasm
in economic activity between 1929 and 1937 and the valley
between 1937 and 1939. The significant question raised by the
'thirties is not what happened to aggregate activity, but why
economic progress suffered its severest setback of recent times.
This question has evoked lively debates in which many econo-
mists have participated. One group, largely of the Keynesian
persuasion, holds the view that profound changes have been
occurring for some time in the dynamic factors of our economic
life, but that their full impact was delayed by the outbreak
of World War I and other special circumstances until the
nineteen-thirties. This group stresses the declining rate of po-
pulation growth, the disappearance of the frontier, and the
capital-saving character of many modern technological innova-
tions—all of which, it is argued, is tending to check investment
outlets severely. Another group traces the stagnation of the
'thirties to ill-judged policies of government, particularly with
respect to labor, industrial combinations, public utilities, and
the public debt. A third group rationalizes the'thirtiesin
terms of a peculiar conjuncture of short and long cycles, or in
terms of a haphazard succession of businesscycles. Each group
has defended its position with persuasive logic and reassuring
statistics, but no one has as yet presented an interpretation of
the 'thirties that weighs carefully and dispassionately the many
conflicting pieces of evidence.
That is by no means an easy task, as an examination of
Table1and the fuller exhibit in the Appendix wili quickly
demonstrate. Stagnation—once we have learned how to use this
term—may perhaps describe adequately the aggregate output
and employment of the 'thirties, but it describes little else. The
period was anything but stagnant, even if the violent cyclical
movements are put out of sight, as they are very roughly in
Table 1. It was a period of turbulence, of swift and momen-
13TABLE 1
Conspectus of Economic Changes, United States, 1923-1939
(AUfiguresare expressed as relatives on a 1929 base. The original figures for
everyyear from 1923 through 1939 and sources are givenin the Appendix. In
some instances therelativesare computed from figures carried to more places
than are shown in the Appendix.)
Series
no. Series 1923 1929 1937 1939
POPULATION
(1)Total 92 100 106 107
(2) Annual increment 158 100 69 83
GROSSNATIONAL PRODUCTa
(3)Total 81 100 97 103
Consumer outlay
(4) Total 81 100 103 111
(5)Perishable goods 84 100 122 129
(6)Semidurable goods 83 100 84 95
(7)Durable goods 75 100 83 80
(8)Services 79 100 99 111
Gross capital formation
(9)Total 82 100 71 73
(10)Producer durable goods 77 100 88 81
(11) Residential construction 103 100 51 76
(12) Private nonresidential construction 69 100 40 33
(13)Public Construction 58 100 88 100
LABOR FORCEb
(14)Total 90 100 110 112
Numberemployed
(15)Total 90 100 98 97
(16)Civil nonagricultural 86 100 97 95




(18)Output 92 100 106 111
(19)Number employed 105 100 91 89
(20)Output per worker 87 100 116 124
Coal mining
(21) Output 111 100 80 73
(22)Number employed 132 100 90 82
(23)Hours per worker 88 100 76 70
(24) Output per man-hour 96 100 116 126
Manufacturing
(25)Output 77 100 103 103
(26)Numberemployed 98 100 102 94
(27)Hoursper worker 104 100 84 82
(28) Output per man-hour 76 100 121 133
Steam railroads
(29)Output 98 100 81 75
(30)Numberemployed 112 100 68 60
(31)Hours per worker 103 100 94 94
(32)Output per man-hour 85 100 127 132
Electriclight and power
(33)Output 50 100 136 152
(34)Number employed 67 100 96 93
(35)Hoursper worker 98 100 86 85
(36)Output per man-hour 72 100 164 192TABLE 1(cont.)
Series
no. Series 1923 1929 1937 1939
INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS
Income payments
(37)Total 82 100 86 85
(38) Wages and salaries 83 100 91 90
(39) Entrepreneurial withdrawals 84 100 84 85
(40) Dividends, interest,and rent 79 100 73 69
Relativeshare going to highest
(41) 1% of income recipie•nts 85 100 90 82
(42) 5% of income recipients 88 100 92 90
Net income after federal income tax,
for incomes of
(43) $ 5,000 99 100 99 99
(44) 10,000 97 100 97 97
(45) 25,000 96 100 94 94
(46) 100,000 91 100 80 80
(47) 500,000 78 100 50 50
(48) 1,000,000 76 100 42 42
LABORMARKET
Average hourly earnings
(49) Manufacturing 92 100 110 112
(SO)Coal mining 116 100 120 125
(51)Steam railroads 92 100 106 112
Average daily wage
(52)Farm laborers 100 100 72 69
(53) Tradeunion membership 106 100 195 239
(54) Number of workers on strike 262 100 644 405
COMMODITYPRICES
(55)'All'commodities 106 100 91 81
(56)Raw materials 101 100 87 72
(57)Semi-manufactured goods 126 100 91 82
(58)Finished goods 105 100 92 85
(59)Building materials 114 100 100 95
(60)Business capital goods 104. 100 99 99
(61)Cost of living 100 100 84- 81
STATUS OF CORPORATIONS
(62) Number active 78 100 99 97
(63)New incorporations 100 63 57
Profits
(64)Total 62 100 48 6Z
(65)Dividends paid 61 100 82 67
(66)Income retained 65 100 —93 43
(67) Depreciation and depletion 61 100 .85 86
SECURITIES MARKET
Prices of common stocks
(68)'All' 36 100 58 47
(69)Industrial 35 100 69 55
(70)Public utility 31 100 40 36
(71)Railroad 49 100 19
(72) Shares traded 21 100 36 23
(73) Corporate security issues 32 100 24 22
15TABLE 1.(concl.)
Series
no. Series 1923 1929 1937 1939
INTERESTRATES
(74) Commercial paper rate 86 100 16 12
Customers' rate
(75)New. York City 88 100 41 39c
(76)Southern and western cities 97 100 68 67C
(77)Spread: (76)—(75) 288 100 669 685c
Corporatebond yields
(78)Moody's i4aa bonds lOS 100 69 64
(79)Moody's Baa bonds 123 100 85 84.
(80)Spread: (79)—(78) [81 100 151 167
SUPPLY AND TURNOVER OF MONEY
(81) Currency in public circulation 103 100 155 168
(82) Deposits 75 100 99 106
(83) Turnover of deposits 70 tOO 54 45
Bank debits
(84)Total 54 100 51 46
(85)New York City 39 100 33 28




(88) Exports 80 100 64 61
FEDERAL FINANCE
(89) R.eceiptsb 97 100 141 120
(90) Expendituresb 97 100 242 277
(91) Total debt 132 100 211 238
a Adjusted for changes in prices.
b Rdatives for 1923 are not strictly comparable with those for 1937 and 1939. See Appendix.
c Computed from data for 1938. See Appendix, notes (75)-(76).
tous change in nearly every department of economic life. Let
us stand back in 1929 and look ten years forward in our table.
What do we see? A growth in population but a drop in the
rate of growth; some decline in the number of active
tions and a severe slump in the formation of new ones; con-
sumer outlay in constant prices up 11 per cent, gross capital
formation down 27 per cent; consumer outlay on perishable
goods up 29 per cent, on durable goods down 20 per cent;
public construction unchanged, residential construction down 24
per cent, business construction down 67 per cent; the flow of
income payments reduced but the inequality of personal incomes
apparently lessened; technological progress making rapid strides
over a wide range of industries; the cost of living down 19
per cent, the average hourly earnings of factory workers up 12
per cent, their hours worked per week down 18 per cent, and
16the number of them employed down 6 per cent; a still greater
improvement in the real hourly earnings of coal miners but not
in their employment; a sharp deterioration of farm wages; a
vast growth of trade unionism and industrial strife; wholesale
commodity prices in general down 19 per cent, but prices of
4flnished' products down only 15 per cent, of building materials
5percent, and of business capital goods 1 per cent; corporate
profits much reduced and new security issues down to a trickle;
the stock market in a bad slump, particularly the prices of rail-
road and public utility stocks; interest rates on the highest
grade loans sharply down but the spread among different types
of interest rates very much widened; bank deposits up 6 per
cent but their rate of turnover much reduced; currency in the
hands of individuals and firms up 68 per cent; foreign trade a
shadow of its former self; the federal income tax pressing
much harder, especially on the upper brackets, yet the federal
debt sharply up; the output of agriculture up 11 per cent, of
coal down 27 per cent, of manufacturing up 3 per cent, of rail-
roads down 2S per cent, of electric light and power up 52
percent.
This bare recital might be elaborated to advantage, and a
contrast drawn between the 'new era' of the 'twenties and the
'stagnation'of the 'thirties—both being represented in our
table. But the recital suffices for my present purpose, which is
merely to show that for a period as complicated and turbulent
as the 'thirties itis not difficult to find particular facts that
agreeably support any one of several simple hypotheses. To
some extent that is always a danger in historical
tion,and theonlyrealsafeguardagainstitisthorough
scholarship. For some time we have planned. a volume that
would sum up and interpret the massive information developed
in our studies of production, employment, and productivity.
The most important problem to be faced in that final volume is
the setback to economic progress in the 'thirties: whether that
decade defines a new trend of stagnation or a passing historical
episode. To serve this purpose it will be necessary to cover the
secular changes inthe output and employment of American
industry at least since the Civil W7ar. Also, the depression of
17the'thirties should be compared with the severe depressions
that followed the crises of 1837, 1873, and 1893, and some
analysis of foreign experience made. The investigation will
start from our findings on employment and production, and as
it proceeds draw heavily on results reached in our historical
studies of national income, agriculture, transportation, construc-
tion, mechanization, trade unionism, migration, wages, prices,
interest rates, security markets and banking. Doubtless, a great
deal of new and difficult research will still be necessary, espe-
cially in connection with foreign countries and the period be-
fore 1900 in this country. But an objective interpretation of the
'thirtiesisof vital significance; and if our resources prove
adequate, we should not be deterred by the prospect that the
capstone of our studies in production and employment may
develop into a series of monographs instead of a single volume.
A study that comes to grips with the doctrine of secular stag-
nation must deal not only with the hypothesis of declining or
inadequate investment opportunity, but also with the second
main pillar of the Keynesian edifice—namely, the assumption
that the consumption function is highly stable. This assumption
raises important questions of economic fact, quite apart from
its bearing on the stagnation thesis. A tentative exploration of
the existing statistics indicates that the consumer outlay corre-
sponding to a national income of a given size varies appreciably
with the month of the year, the stage of the business cycle, and
with time generally; in other words, that the consumption func-
tion is subject to seasonal, cyclical, and secular shifts. Further-
more, random shifts seem so considerable in any one group
of statistics, and to differ so much from one group to another,
that our ability to forecast what increment of consumer outlay
will accompany a specified increment of income, to say nothing
of a specified increment of governmental loan expenditure, is
as yet very limited. These results should be tested, converted
into quantitative statements if possible, and pushed in a con-
structive direction; in other words, astatisticaltest of the
Keynesian assumption concerning the relative stability of the
consumption function should become an incident in a positive
analysis of the influences that play on consumer spending over
Istime. Numerous studies already made by the National Bureau
or now in process will contribute materially to this undertaking
—especially the investigation by. Ruth Mack of the shoe market
and other aspects of the purchasing and prices of consumer
goods, the studies on national income and consumer outlay by
Kuznets, Shaw and Barger, on consumer debt by the Financial
Research Program, on capital gains and losses by Seltzer, and
on the inequality of personal incomes by Friedman, Kuznets
and Mendershausen.
The study of consumer spending links up with the study of
secular stagnation when interest turns to the secular shifts in
the spending-savings pattern. Common observation and some
existing statistics suggest that, for the population as a whole,
thrift has been declining over the decades in the sense that the
average saving at a given level of family income has been
shrinking. If such a trend has continued into the present, there
is less reason to fear secular stagnation than if the trend has
been arrested. The data necessary to develop adequately the
secular aspects of consumption and saving will not be easy to
find or to interpret when.found, but the importance of the ques-
tion may justify our taking the risk.
IV THE NEED FOR TESTED KNOWLEDGE OF BUSINESS CYCLES
The investigations I have sketched deal with certain of the
institutional assumptions of the Keynesian economists. If these
investigations prosper they should help materially to clarify
public thinking about the problem of maintaining a stable and
high level of employment in the years ahead. But 'these in-
vestigations cannot be more than pieces in the solution of the
great puzzle of business cycles.
From its inception the National Bureau recognized the need
of thorough study of economic fluctuations. A program of re-
search in business cycles was authorized by the Executive Com-
mittee in 1921, and has led to substantial publications on dif-
ferent aspects of the subject by King, Thorp, Jerome, Mit-
chell, Wolman, Macaulay, Clark, Schmidt, Gayer, Mills, and
Haberler. A volume on Measuring Business Cycles will be off
19the press in a matter of weeks, and other reports will follow
shortly. Not a few of our studies abound in subtle theoretical
analysis, but they stress especially those observable phenomena
of cyclical behavior which in common parlance pass as 'facts'.
This feature of our work reflects a cool scientific judgment:
viz., if business cycles are to be explained reliably, we should
have precise and tested knowledge of what the business cycles
of actual life have been like. Unless such knowledge isat-
tained, any explanation is bound to bear an uncertain relation
to the experiences we seek to understand or to guard against.
The consequences that may flow from a disregard of this
elementary precaution are exemplified in Keynes' sketch of
business cycles at the end of his long treatise on underemploy-
ment equilibrium. Keynes starts by saying that a theory of
business cycles should °account for a certain regularity in the
duration and sequence of cyclical phases—that the duration
of contractions,for example,isabout three tofiveyears.
Second, the theory should account for the sharp and sudden
transition from expansion to contraction, in contrast to the
gradual and hesitantshiftfrom contractiontoexpansion.
These starting points for a theoretical inquiry suggest preocupa-
tion with a single dramatic case—the collapse from 1929 to
1933. In the United States at least, business-cycle contractions
have not run typically from three to five years; the typical
duration is much shorter. Nor isthere any such systematic
difference between the upper and lower turning pointsas
Keynes supposes. The upturn of 1933 in this country
to his rule, the upturns of 1924 and 1938 do not, nor do the
downturns of 1926 and 1937—to mention only a few recent
Since Keynes works with an artificially simplified business
.cycle, it is not surprising, that his explanation collides with the
facts of experience. His ticeory is that a collapse of investment
brings prosperity to a close; that this in turn is caused by a
collapseconfidence regarding the profitability of durable
assets; and that the contraction which follows is bound to last3
say, three to five years, since recovery is possible oniy after
stocks have been worked off, and more important still,after
the 'fixed' capital of business firms has been reduced sufficiently
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21It is tempting for statistical investigators, as it is for specu-
lative writers, to analyze business cycles on the basis of com-
prehensive aggregates. But although broad index numbers or
aggregates give useful summaries, they tell nothing of the
processes by which they are fashioned. The conception of a
business cycle as a synchronous expansion of all economic activi-
ties followed by a synchronous contraction, which theorists so
often hold, is not drawn from life. Expansions and contrac-
tions occur together,'side by side, at every stage of the business
cycle. If that fact sometimes escapes our notice, it is only be-
cause we are in the habit of watching aggregates. Pulsating
movements go on steadily within the aggregates, and they often
have no close relation to the cyclical tide of the aggregates.
A community, an industry, an individual firm experiences a
rise here and a fall there; each faces some pressure or oppor-
tunity of its own—finding an outlet for its wares, adjusting
to a competitor's improved technology, financing an expansion
of output, replacing an exhausted source of raw materials,
starting a new business, converting to a new kind of produc-
tion, adjusting to new governmental regulations, and so on.
These divergencies in economic fortune are no less important
for the understanding of business cycles than is the dominance
of expansion during some periods and of contraction during
others.
The character of the employment problem is not brought
out adequately by existing statistics, and it will not be until
statistical agencies publish three figures instead of one for each
industry and all industries combined; thatis,the number of
employees in'firms'experiencing arisein employment, the
number in'firms'experiencing a declinein employment, as
well as the total number employed. A rough equivalent of this
type of information, however, is the breakdown of some aggre-
gate figure, such as factory employment, into industrial corn-
ponents. Our Business Cycle Unit has analyzed the behavior
of many of the published subdivisions as well as of the broad
composites. Table 2 shows the distribution of changes in direc-
tion of 21 •independent series on factory employment, from
stage to stage of the four business cycles in this country from
22TABLE 2
Directions of Change from Stage to Stage of Business Cycles
Index of Factory Employment and 21 of Its Components
United States, 1921-1938
Direction of
change of index Number of components that
of factory Show no
Cycle and interval employment Rise Fall change
Cycle of Sept. 1921 to July 1924
Stage I to stage II + 11 9
Stage II to stage III + 13 8
Stage III to stage IV + 18 3
Stage IV to stage V + 16 4
Stage V to stage VI — 11. 10
Stage VI to stage VII — 3 18
Stage VII to stage VIII 3 18
Stage VIII to stage IX 2 19
Cycle of July 1924 to Dec. 1927
Stage I to stage II + 15 6
Stage II to stage III + 16 5
Stage III to stage IV + 13 S
Stage IV to stage V + it 10
Stage V to stage VI — 9 12
Stage VI to stage VII 12 9
Stage VII to stage Vu 9 12
Stage VIII to stage IX 5 16
Cycle of Dec. 1927 to Marc/i 1933
Stage I to stage II + 8 12
Stage II to stage III + 11 10
Stage III to stage IV + 17 4
Stage IV to stage V + 15 6
Stage V to stage VI — 2 19
Stage VI to stage VII ... 21
Stage VII to stage VIII .-. 21
Stage VIII to stage IX 5 16
Cycle of March 1933 to May 1938
Stage I to stage II + 21.
StageII to stage III + 19 2
StageIII to stage IV + 18 3
Stage IV to stage V + 20 1
Stage V to stage VI — 6 15
Stage VI to stage VII ... 21
Stage VII to stage VIII 2 19
Stage VIII to stage IX 6 15
of 4 cycles, 1921-1938
Stage I to stage II + 13.8 6.8 0.5
Stage II to stage III + 14.8 6.2
Stage III to stage IV + 4.5
Stage IV to stage V + .15.5 5.2 0.2
Stage V to stage VI : — 7.0 14.0
Stage VI to stage VII — 3.8 17.2
Stage VII to stage VIII 3.5 17.5
Stage VIII to stage IX 4.5 16.5
Stage I represents the initial trough of a business cycle, stages IIIV successive thirds of.
expansion, stage. V the peak, stages VI.VIII successive thirds of contraction, and stage IX
the terminal trough. For explanations of the chronology of business cycles and their division
(Concludedon paqe 24)
231921 to 1938. We find that expansions are imperfectly diffused
during a cyclical upswing in aggregate activity, and that con-
tractions are imperfectly diffused during a cyclical downswing.
But the diffusion is much greater during a vigorous cyclical
movement such as that from 1929 to 1933 than during a mild
cyclical movement such as that from 1926 to 1927. There is
also some tendency for the diffusion to be greater during the
middle stages of a cyclical upswing or downswing in aggre-
gateactivity than during the transitionalstages from one
phase to the other. If our table covered 210 series instead of
21 it would doubtless show smaller diffusion throughout. That
would also be true if we examined shorter periods than our
stage-to-stage intervals, which is a matter of some importance
in a long cyclical phase such as that of 1929-33. On the other
hand, it seems likely that if the table showed the actual volume
of employment gained by industries experiencing a rise and the
actual volume lost by industries experiencing a decline, the dif-
fusion would appear greater than it does in the present table.
But even as the figures stand, they bring out a vital feature of
business cycles. They suggest that the mere maintenance of
aggregate expenditure by governmental action may give slight
aid to the declining sectors of the economy just after a peak
in aggregate activity has been passed; further, since no two
contractions are strictly alike,a governmental policy aiming
at 'full employment' will need to rely on measures that are
adjusted from case to case.
The breakdown of aggregates not only helps to define the
nature of the business-cycle problem; it often also gives a clue
to the processes that link different business factors together.
Suppose, for example, that 'investment' goes up. This may be
a sign that business will soon improve materially, as when ex-
tensive new construction gets under way; or it may be a sign
Note toTable 2 concluded:
into stages, see A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, Ch. 4, See. III-
V; Ch. 5, Sec. VII; and Appendix A. The employment series are indexes by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, adjusted for seasonal variations. The 21 components are the maximum number
of subdivisions available in our business-cycle collection. They include flour, baking, cane sugar
refining, slaughtering and meat packing, tobacco manufactures, cotton goods,silk and rayon
goods, dyeing and finishingtextiles,men's clothing,shirts and collars,women's clothing,
millinery, leather, boots and shoes, paper and printing,iron and steel products, furniture,
glass,ttaüsportation equipment, machinery, building materials. These series represent 67%
of total factory employment in 1923-25.
24that business will soon get worse, as when goods pile up beyond
dealers' intentions. The ambiguity can be cleared up a little by
examining investment in inventories apart from investment in
structures and equipment. But the cyclical behavior of inven-
tories, or of net changes in inventories, is itself a resultant of
highly diverse patterns. For example, the stocks held by manu-
facturers tend to lag about nine months on the average at the
cyclical, turns in production; this lag covers up the tendency of
goods in process to move synchronously with production, of
raw material stocks to lag about two months at cyclical turns,
and of stocks of finished manufactured staples to lag more than
a year. These findings set a problem. Why, for example, is
the adjustment of stocks of finished staples retarded so long?
This question naturally impels an investigator to examine the
behavior of production, shipments, and prices.
Again, broad composites on construction contracts and build-
ing permits show that commitments for new structures as a
rule begin to decline while industrial production, employment,
and national income are still expanding; further, commitments
for new structures as a rule turn upward months before general
business activity revives. It is tempting to suggest an explana-
tion of the cyclical lead in terms of broad market forces. But
such an explanation cannot be entertained seriously unless the
cyclical leads that appear in the aggregates of construction
work are repeated in minor subdivisions. To this question the
statistics give, on the whole, an affirmative answer, but the
breakdown also discloses systematic discrepancies in the move-
ments of different parts of construction. For example, public
and institutional projects tend to move irregularly in relation
to business cycles while private projects conform closely; resi-
dential projects tend to lead industrial projects both at recov-
eries and recessions; contracts for new factories in industries
organized into many small units seem to lead contracts of
industries characterized by relatively few but large units; new
railroad projects led cyclical recoveries in the eighteen-seven-
ties and 'eighties by a substantial interval, but the lead shrank
with the passage of time and has now disappeared. These and
similar findingsincite a realistic investigator to examine the
25C-
changingpace of new investment undertakings in relation to
the circumstances peculiar to different classes of investors, as
well as in relation to factors—such as the movement of na-
tional income, construction costs, interest rates, and the policies
of lenders—which may beexpected toinfluence investors
generally. Further, just as the investigator must work back-
ward from contracts to the factors that shape investment deci-
sions, so he must work forward and analyze the timing of
construction expenditures and of completed projects. As long
as production periods are short, as is true of the great bulk of
manufactured commodities, itissufficient ordinarily to speak
of the production of an industry during a certain month or
year without specifying whether 'production'referstothe
volume started, or the volume executed, or the volume com-
pleted. These distinctions can be neglected in the case of the
construction industry only at the risk of confusion and error.
For example, contracts for factory construction typically reach
a peak about two months before general business activity turns
down, but it appears that the crop of newly completed fac-
tories reaches its maximum when contraction is well under way
—or Just in time to intensify the competitive struggle then in
process.
I have stressed the importance of breaking down aggregates
because this matter, so slighted by the Keynesian economists,
is a central feature of our own work on business cycles. It ex-
plains better than anything else why our investigations extend
over years. Happily, we have reached a point where a substan-
tial part of our results will soon be made available to the
public. As Part Two of this report indicates in detail, several
of our monographs on special topics are close to the stage of
publication. Most important of all, we expect to publish this
year Wesley Mitchell's progress report on What Happens
during Business Cycles. This volume will be the first instalment
of a grand synthesis of our cyclical measurements, which even
in their present unfinished state cover a very wide range of
economic activities. Mitchell's progress report will render ob-
soletehisCaliforniatreatise,which—althoughpublished
thirty-three years ago—has remained tothis day the best
26theoretical account of how the economic organization of the
'Western world generates business cycles.
We hope that our quest of the lessons of experience will aid
other students, as well as laymen who must wrestle practical-
ly with business cycles. Whether a cyclical downturn can be
recognized promptly enough to permit immediate governmental
intervention, whether cost-price relations are of slight conse-
quenceinthe termination of a boom, whether inflationary
tendencies become important oniy as 'full employment' is ap-
proached, whether the volume of the circulating medium rises
and falls in close sympathy with aggregate activity, whether
minor cycles mainly reflect inventory fluctuations, whether the
volume of investment ismaterially affected over periods of
business-cycle length by the rate of change in consumer spend-
ing—these and similar matters are, after all, not metaphysical
questions. True, the most painstaking studies of experience
will not always lead to conclusive answers; but they should at
least narrow the margins of uncertainty, and thus furnish a.
better basis than now exists for dealing with grave issues of
business-cycle theory and policy.
V THE RANGE AND OF THE BUREAU'S
RESEARCH PROGRAM
If I am right in believing that the Keynesian thinking of our
times makes realistic investigation of business cycles more neces-
sary than ever, we should seek to intensify our work on that
subject. The obvious method of promoting this objective is to
expand the Business Cycle Unit well beyond its present size, but
such a policy would be shortsighted. The 'material' of specu-
lative investigations of business cycles consists largely of con-
cepts and models, which often have no obvious use in any other
branch of economics.Realisticinvestigations, on the other
hand, draw their material from records of experience. In such
inquiries the subject of business cycles can never be put in a
box byitself.Any recordthat makesacontributionto
knowledge of how our economic organization works becomes
automatically a datum in business-cycle analysis. That is clear-
27ly true of records that come in the shape of time series, 4nd is
110 less true of cross-section studies which indicate the order
of magnitude of economic quantities.
The main reason why we are able to conduct the far-reach-
ing studies of business fluctuations that I have sketched in this
reportisthat throughout our history we have done basic
statistical research on national income, production, employ-
ment, prices, wages, and finance. These inquiries have devel-
oped factual information of the highest importance, have
stimulated work by other students, and led to improvements
in the work of official agencies. Their work in turn has stimu-
lated ours, and this process must continue. The study of na-
tional incomeisouroldestenterprise,and one thathas
proved especially useful to economists, businessmen, and public
officials.Nevertheless, vitaldifferences of concept and fact
stilldivide estimators of national income. Employment esti-
mates have been much improved and extended in recent years,
but it •is uncertain whether they can meet the strain that may
soon be put on them. Measures of the cost of living and
price indexes of other typesstillrequire carefulattention,
especially in comparisons of distant periods and different coun-
tries. We are therefore not only continuing, but expanding our
work in these directions. Meanwhile we are engaged in new
statistical explorations of the flow of money payments, urban
real estate finance, and agricultural finance. We expect that
besides making a direct contribution to knowledge, these ex-
plorations will lead tosubstantial improvements incurrent
statistics.
The usefulness of our various studies extends beyond their
value in business-cycle analysis. Although the issue of 'full
employment' justly dominates economic thinking today, we
must not allow our concern with that problem to blind us to
other matters of genuine significance. Apart from the ravages
of unemployment the standard of living is still appallingly low
for the great masses of mankind, and different groups of
society—within and across national boundaries—have special
and changing problems of. their own. In the years ahead we
must continue to shape our research program with an eye to
28these requirements for economic knowledge, as well as the
problem of business cycles. 'SvVe must continue to focus attention
on the large issues concerning the 'production, exchange and
distribution of wealth', substitute as far as possible facts for
speculations, remain critical of our work, strive steadily to im-
prove it, and cooperate with others. If our zeal and industry
remain strong, we shall not fail to render a definite service
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APPENDIX
A Record of Salient Economic Changes, United States, 1923-1939
Series
no. Series Unit 19231924192519261927
POPULATION
(1) Total Million 111.9114.1115.8117.4119.0
(2) Annual increment Million 2.0301.9411.6421.6031.551
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(3) Total Billion 1929 $ 78.880.382.988.589.5
Consumeroutlay
(4) Total Billion 1929 $ 61.966.064.970.071,7
(5)Perishablegoods Billion 1929 $ 23.525.325.126.326.8
(6)Semidurable goods Billion 1929 $ 9.8 9.0 9.910.011.2
(7)Durable goods Billion 1929 $ 6.6 6.9 7.8 8.6 8.2
(8)Services Billion 1929 $ 22.024.822.025.125.5
Gross capital formation
(9)Total Billion 1929 $ 16.914.218.018.617.8
(10)Producer durable goods Billion 1929 $ 5.8 5.4 6.0 6.5 6.1
(11)Residential construction Billion 1929 $ 3.8 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.5
(12)Private nonresidential con-
struction Billion 1929 $ 2.9 3.0 3.4 4.0 4.1
(13)Public construction Billion 1929 $ 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3
LABOR FORCE





(16a)Civil nonagricultural—NICB Million 30.930.432.033.233.3
(16b) - —BLS Million





(18)Output 1929 :100 92 95 96 101 98
(19)Number employed 1929: 100 105 104104104 101
(20)Output per worker 1929: 100 87 91 92 97 97
Coal mining
(21)Output 1929: 100 111 98 94109 100
(22) Number employed Thousand 862 779 749 759 759
(23)Hoursper worker No. per year 1,5691,5501,5521,7811,602
(24) Output per man-hour 1929: 100 96 94 94 94 96
Manufacturing
(25) Output 1899: 100 280 266 298 316 317
(26)Numberemployed 1899 :100 183 170 175 179 175
(27) Hours per worker No. per week 47.3 45.4 46.3 46.546.3
(28) Output per man-hour 1899 :100 177 189 201 208 214
Steam railroads
(29) Output 1929 :100 98 92 97 102 98
(30) Number employed 1929 :100 112 106 105 107 105
(31) Hours per worker 1929: 100 103 100 100 101 100
(32) Output per man-hour 1929: 100 85 87 92 94 93
Electric light and power
(33) Output 1929 :100 50 55 64 74 82
(34)Number employed 1929: 100 67 72 74 83 86
(35) Hours per worker No. per week 45.645.946.144.945.8





73.276.475.768.661.2 61.567.267.373.5 79.079.785.1 (4)
26.728.027.526.225.926.9 28.629.632.9 34.234.236.1 (5)
11.211.810.6 10.5 9.5 8.7 8.7 9.5 10.2 9.910.011.2(6)
8.4 8.8 6.9 5.7 4.3 4.2 4.7 5.9 7.1 7.3 5.9 7.0 (7)
26.927.330.626.!21.621.725.222.323.327.629.6 30.8 (8)
17.420.7 14.3 10.2 3.8 4.2 5.0 9.6 13.8 14.8 11.0 15.1(9)
6.5 7.5 6.1 4.1 2.5 2.7 3.4 4.5 5.7 6.6 4.7 6.1(10)
4.1 3.7 2.1 1.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.8(11)
4.1 4.2 3.7 2.3 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.4(12)






33.3 31.128.024.724.727.028.0 30.1 32.1 30.131.6(16b)
1.9 0.4 (17a)
1.5 4.2 7.911.912.6 11.010.2 8.6 7.3 9.9 8.8(17b)
102 100 100 104 100 97 84 92 93 106 105 111(18)
101 100 98 98 96 95 93 95 93 91 90 89(19)
102.100 102 107 104 102 90 97 100 116 117 124(20)
96 100 89 74 60 63 70 70 80 80 65 73(21)
683 654 644590 528 523 567 566 579 591 538 538(22)
1,6601,7801,5571,3471,2081,3691,3621,3041,4241,3601,1501,254(23)
99 100 104 109 111 103 105 110 113 116 122 126(24-)
332 364 311 262 197 228 252 301 353 376 295 374-(25)
175 187 162 137 117 129 151 160 174- 191 160 176(26)
46.1 4.5.743.541.7 38.237.8 34.536.5 39.1 38.635.537.6(27)
226 233 241 252 240 256 265 281 285 281 284 309(28)
98 100 86 69 52 55 60 63 76 81 66 75(29)
100 100 90 76 62 59 61 60 65 68 58 60(30)
100 100 96 92 87 87 90 91 94 94 93 94(31)
98 100 100 99 96 108 109 117 125 127 122 132(32)
90 100 104 102 93 93 99 108 123 136 137 152(33)
92 100 103 96 84 78 82 84 90 96 93 93(34)
45.646.647.047.144.042.0 38.839.340.140.3 39.939.6(35)
100 100 99 105 117 131 146 153 160 164 172 192(36)APPENDIX (cont.)
Series
no. Series Unit 19231924192519261927
INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS
Income payments
(37)Total Billion $ 67.969.172.075.076.1
(38)Wages and salaries Billion $ 43.343.345.048.048.4
(39)Entrepreneurial withdrawals Billion $ 11.311.912.512.512.6
(40)Dividends, interest, and rent Billion $ 13.213.814.514.615.1
Relative share going to highest
(41)1% of income recipients Per cent 12.3 12.913.713.914.4
(42)5% of income recipients Per cent 22.9 .24.325.225.226.0
Net income after federal income
tax, for incomes of
(43)$ 5,000 Thousand $ 4.9494.9744.9924.9924.992
(44) 10,000 Thousand $ 9.6589.8599.9179.9179.917
25,000 Thousand $ 23.1323.4823.8723.8723.87
(46) 100,000 Thousand $ 77.4477.4683.9783.9783.97
(47) 500,000 Thousand $ 304.6300.5384.0384.0384.0




(50)Coal mining Dollar .832.826.810.801.774
•(51)Steam railroads Dollar .581.592.599.599.610
Average daily wage
(52)Farm laborers Dollar 2.252.292.292.312.28
(53) T.rade union membership Thousand 3,4393,3643,3603,3383,366
(54-) Number of workers on strike Thousand 757 655 428 330 330
COMMODITY PRICES
Wholesale
(55)'All' commodities 1926 :100 100.6 98.1103.5100.0 95.4
(56)Raw materials 1926:100 98.597.6106.7100.096.5
(57)Semi-manufactured goods 1926:100 118.6108.7105.3100.094.3
(58)Finished goods 1926 :100 99.296.3100.6100.095.0
(59)Building materials 1926 :100 108.7102.3101.7100.094.7
(60)Business capital goods 1929: 100 103.5101.4 99.5 99.4 99.2
(61) Cost of living 1935-39: 100 121.9122.2125.4126.4124.0
STATUS OF CORPORATIONS
(62) Number active Thousand 381 399 411435454
(63)New incorporations 1925 :100 ... 83 100 100 103
Profits
(64) Total Billion $ 4.7 4.1 5.1 6.9 5.5
(65)Dividends paid Billion $ 3.7 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.9
(66)Income retained Billion $ 1.0 0.4 0.8 2.3 0.6
(67) Depreciation and depletion Billion $ 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.4
SECURITIES MARKET
Pricesof common stocks
(68) 'All' 1935-39 :100 72.9 76.9 94.8105.6124.9
(69)Industrial 1935-39:100 60.1 62.979.9 90.3107.0
(70)Public utility 1935-39: 100 86.292.1110.9116.9135.5
(71) Railroad — 1935-39: 100190;6203.5237.5265.1315.8
(72) Sharestraded Million 236284460452 582




49.452.247.840.5 31.7 30.1 34.937.942.847.544.447.2(38)
12.913.412.811.2 9.7 9.0 9.1 9.5 10.111.211.111.4(39)
15.716.816.0 13.4. 10.6 9.6 9.710.6 11.612.210.711.6(40)











2.272.252.081.621.20 1.11 1.261.33 1.421.61 1.581.56(52)
3,2973,2393,1893,1702,9952,8323,4753,4703,8746,3047,7147,729(53)
314 289 183 342 3241,1681,4671,117 7891,861 6881,171(54)
96.7 95.386.473.064.8 65.974.980.080.886.378.677.1(55)
99.1 97.584.365.655.1 56.568.677.179.9 84.872.070.2(56)





473 486 495 491 481 475 472 478 480 479 472 470(62)
110 112 100 99 95 89 74 74 75 71 63 63(63)
6.3 7.6 5.1 1.2—2.0 —1.7 —0.4 1.6 4.2 3.6 2.8 4.7(64)
5.3 6.1 5.8 4.3 2.8 2.3 2.9 3.7 4.9 5.0 3.5 4.1(65)
0.9 1.5—0.7 —3.1—4.8—4.0 —3.3—2.1—0.7 —1.4 —0.7 0.6(66)









no. Series Unit 19231924192519261927
INTERESTRATES
(74) Commercial paper rate Per cent 4.973.904.004.234.02
Customers' rate
(75)New York City Per cent 5.194.604.474.674.53
(76)Southern and western cities Per cent 5.945.71 5.585.615.60
(77)Spread: (76)—(75) Per cent 0.75 1.111.110.941.07
Corporate bond yields
(78)Moody's bonds Per cent 5.125.00 4.88 4.73 4.57
(79)Moody's Baa bonds Per cent 7.246.836.27 5.48
(80)Spread: (79)—(78) Per cent 2.121.831.391.140.91
SUPPLY AND TURNOVER OF MONEY
(81) Currency in public circulation Billion $ 3.69 3.713.623.653.63
(82) Deposits Billion $ 38.541.044.646.748.5
(83) Turnover of deposits No. per year 20.820.721.722.223.4
Bank debits
(84)Total Billion $ 685 716 820 872 952
(85)New York City Billion $ 281 312 369400463
(86)Outside New York City Billion $ 404404 451 472 489
FOREIGNTRADE
(87) Imports Billion $ 3.793.614.234.434.18
(88) Exports Billion $ 4.174.594.914.814.87
FEDERAL FINANCE
(89) Receipts Billion $ 4.113.913.824.094.09
(90) Expenditures Billion $ 3.252.973.093.013.00
(91) Total debt Billion $ 22.421.420.719.8t8.7
NOTES ON SERIES
(1). July 1 estimates for continental United States, by the Bureau of the Census.
Based on statistics of births, deaths, civilian immigration and emigration, in con-
junction with the decennial census. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1943, p. 3.
(2). Year-to-year differences computed from series(1)before rounding, centered
by a two-year moving average.
(3)-(13). In 1929 prices. Simon Kuznets, NationalProduct since 1869 (National
Bureau, in press), Part I. In the breakdown of gross capital formation presenttd
in our table two components are omitted: net changes in inventories, and net changes
in claims against foreign countries.
(14a). National Industrial Conference Board, Tue Management Almanac, 1945, pp.
18, 27. (Employment plus unemployment.)
(14b).U. S.Bureau of Labor Statistics, TechnicalMemorandum No. 20, July4,
1945,Table 1.
(15a). Includes armed forces. Source same as (14a).
(15b). Includes armed forces. Source same as (14b).
(-16a). Omits employment in agriculture, armed forces,and public employees in
serviceindustries. Public employees classified in other industries are included. Com-
puted from data by the National Industrial Conference Board, given in part in
the above source, p.18.
34Series
192819291930193119321933193419351936193719381939 no.










1,.t141,276 931 685 471 437491 547628650 566 592(84)
590 712 454 312 198 190 196 217 247234 199 202(85)
524 564477 373 273 247 295 330 381 416 367 390 (86)
4.09 4.40 3.06 2.09 1.32 1.45 1.66 2.05 2.42 3.08 1.96 2.32 (87)
5.13 5.24 3.81. 2.42 1.61 1.68 2.13 2.28 2.46 3.353.09 3.18 (88)
3.92 4.24 3.952.67 1.88 2.53 3.493.86 4.375.80 5.65 4.92 (89)
3.20 3.333.544.30 4.24 4.397.28 6.68 9.24 7.758.10 8.88(90)
17.7 17.0 16.3 16.8 19.4 22.2 26.629.0 32.5 35.937.8 40.5 (91)
(16b). Omits employment in agriculture, armed forces, and employees of federal,
state and local governments. Computed from data in U. S.Bureauof Labor Statistics,
TechnicalMemorandum No. 16 (July13, 1944) and TechnicalMemorandum No. 20
(July4•,1945).
(17).Series (14) minus series (15), before rounding.
(18). Harold Barger and Hans H. Landsberg, American Agriculture, 1899-1939
(National Bureau, 1942), p. 42.
(19). Gainfully occupied. Unpublished revisions by Solomon Fabricant of estimates
prepared by Barger and Landsberg.
(20). Based on series (18) and (19).
(21). Harold Barger and Sam H.Schurr,The Mining Industries,1899-1939
(National Bureau, 1944), Table A-S. (Indexes for total mining, including oil and
gas wells, 1923-39, are available for output but not for employment, hours, or
hourly earnings. Hence series (21)-(24.) and (50) are restricted to coal mining.)
(22). All employees except office workers. Ibid., Table A-3, and p. 67.
(23). Based on aggregate man-hours and number employed. Ibid., Table A-3.
(24). Based on series (21), (22), and (23). Ibid., Table A-S.
(25). Solomon Fabricant, Labor Savings in American Industry, OccasionalPaper
23(National Bureau, 1945), p. 46.
(26). Wage earners.Ibid.,p. 46.
35(27). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,Bulletin No. 694 (Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1941 ed., Vol. II), p. 16.
(28). Based on series (25), (26), and (27). See Fabricant, cited above, p. 46.
(29). Weighted index of freight traffic (ton-miles) and passenger traffic (passenger-
miles). Unpublished data compiled by Harold Barger and Jacob M. Gould. See
Fabricant, cited above, p. 50.
(30). Wage earners and salaried employees. Ibid.
(31). Unpublished data compiled by Harold Barger and Jacob M. Gould.
(32).Based on series (29),(30), and (31).
(33).Estimates prepared by Jacob M. Gould for a NationalBureau monograph,
Output and Productivity in the Electric and Gas Utilities, 1899-1942. Thefigures
for1927-39 in our table are comparable with employment, i.e.,series(34). The
figures for 1923-26 are not; the indexes of output comparable with employment for
successive years during this period are 47, 53, 62, 73.
(34). Wage earners and salaried employees. ibid.
(35). ibid.
(36). Based on series (33), (34), and (35). For 1923-26 the output figures used
are those cited in the note on series (33). ibid.
(37)-(40). 1923-38: Simon Kuznets, National Income and its Composition, 1919-
1938 (National Bureau, 1941), pp. 322-3. 1939: extrapolated by use of Department
of Commerce data. Series (38) includes wages, salaries, and other compensation
of employees.
(41)-(42). Before federal income taxes. Estimates prepared by Simon Kuznets for
a National Bureau monograph, Some Aspects of the Distribution of Income by Size.
(43)-(48). Computations based on income tax forms and synopses of regulations
in Statistics of Income (U. S. Bureau of Internal Revenue), on the assumption (a)
that the taxpayer is married and living with spouse, (b) that he has two depend-
ents,Cc) that he claims all family exemptions, (d) that his capital gains or losses
arenil,(e)that his income from partially tax-exempt interest on government
obligations isnil,(f)that his income from dividends before 1936 was taxed on
the same principle as in 1936 and later, and (g) that his 'earned net income' is
equal to his total net income (i.e., the $5,000, $10,000, etc., in the table) or not less
than the statutory maximum earned net income, according as his total net income
is smaller or larger than the statutory maximum earned net income. Total net
income is net of all deductions except personal exemption and credit for dependents.
The computations refer, obviously, to hypothetical families. The assumptions
used blink differences in source of income (capital gains and losses, tax-exempt
income, and 'unearned income' generally), differences in family composition, differ-
ences in respect of filing joint or separate returns, and changes in these factors
and in the regulations affecting them. The actual(unaudited) returns for com-
parable income classes as given in Statistics of Income indicate,first,that the
hypothetical figures portray rather faithfully the major changes in the federal
personal income taxstructure,second,thatactualtaxesofthe upper income
brackets relatively to the low brackets are somewhat less than our computations
may suggest.
(49). 1923-31: obtained directly from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1932-39:
36mimeographed releases by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, LS44-3259 (March 1944)
and L846-555 (September 1945).
(50). Weighted average, bituminous and anthracite coal. Computed from data in
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 694, cited above, p. 13, and Bulletin
No. 697 (Hours and Earnings in the United States, 1932-40), p. 122, using man-
hour weights from Barger and Schurr, cited above, p. 312.
(51). U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 694, cited above, p. 10.
(52). Without board.U.S.BureauofAgricultural Economics, Farm Labor,
January 12, 1945, p. 9.
(53). Unpublished estimates for the United States by Leo Wolman. Data for 1923-
34, including Canadian membership, which is roughly 4 or 5 per cent of the total,
are given in Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism (National Bureau,
1936), p. 16.
(54). Includes workers involved in lockouts as well as in strikes. Monthly Labor
Review, May 1945, p. 958.
(55)-(59). U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes. Survey of Current Business,
1942 Supplement, p. 18.
(60). 1923-35: Solomon Fabricant, Capital Consumption and 4djustment (National
Bureau, 1938), Table 32. 1936-39: unpublished data by Fabricant.
(61). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 699 (Changes in Cost of
Living in Large Cities in the United States, 1913-41), Table 2.
(62). Active corporations, including subsidiaries, filing federal income tax returns.
1923-26: reported number active and inactive, multiplied by .896(ratio of active
to total number of corporations in 1927), multiplied by 1.066(ratio of number
active including subsidiaries to number active excluding subsidiaries in1929).
1927-28: reported number active multiplied by 1.066. 1929-39: reported number
active plus reported number of subsidiaries. U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Statistics of income for 1940, Part 2, pp. 282 and 305.
(63). Unpublished index based on data from 6 to 8 states (New York is one of
them), compiled for a National Bureau monograph on incorporations of business
enterprises, by G. Heberton Evans,Jr.Figures for New York State do not
go back of 1924. Indexes for 1923 and 1924 based on 6 states excluding New
York are 99 and 90, respectively.
(64)-(66). Total profits and retained income are adjusted to eliminate effects of
capital gains and losses, inventory revaluations, and the use of a historical cost
ratherthanreproductioncostbasisfordepreciationcharges.1923-38:Simon
Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition, 1919-1938 (National Bureau, 194J),
pp. 216 and 316. 1939: estimate based on Department of Commerce data.
(67). Unpublished estimates by Simon Kuznets, based on Statistics of Income data,
adjusted to reflect reproduction cost instead of historical cost.
(68)-(71). Standard and Poor's Corporation, Trade and Securities Statistics: Long
Term Security Price Index Record, pp. 5-11. (The issue cited is Vol. 96, No. 9,
Sec. 2 of the Corporation's publications.)
(72). Number of shares traded in round lots, as reported by the New York Stock
Exchange. Successive issues of Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
(73). New and refunding; Canadian and foreign issues included. Ibid.
37(74). At New York City. 1923-36: Frederick R. Macaulay, Interest Rates, Bond
Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856 (National Bureau, 1938),
Appendix A, Table 10.1937-39: successive issues of the Bank and Quotation
Record.
(75)-(76). Weighted average of prevailing rates charged by banks to their cus-
'tomers on commercial and other loans. 1923-29: Banking and Monetary Statistics
(Board •of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943), p. 4-63. 1930-38: suc-
cessive issues of the Federal Resercje Bulletin. The number of cities in the Southern
and Western group is 16 in 1923-24, 25 in 1925-28, and 27 in 1929-38.
These series were discontinued in February 1939, when a new method of com-
piling the rates was instituted. The new series are not strictly comparable with the
old. See Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 426-27. Other data suggest that there
was little or no between the rates prevailing in 1938 and 1939.
(78)-(79). Ibid., p. 468. For description of series, see ibid., pp. 429-30.
(81). Annual averages derived from end-of-month figuresestimated by Anna
Jacobson Schwartz and Elma Oliver, National Bureau of Economic Research. The
year-endfigureswere weightedone-halfeachinderivingthecalendar-year
averages.
(82). Annual averages derived from semi-annual call-date figures (December and
June) of total demand and time deposits in all banks, reported in ibid., pp. 34—35.
Collection items and interbank and U. S. government deposits are excluded. The
year-end figures receive a weight of one-half each in the calendar-year averages.
A figure for December 29, 1922 was estimated by Anna Jacobson Schwartz.
(83). Estimated debits at all commercial banks divided by total demand and time
deposits, excluding collection items and interbank deposits (but not U. S. govern-
ment deposits). Ibid., p. 254-.
(84)-(86). Estimates forall commercial banks.Series(84) :ibid.Series(85)
supplied by the Federal Reserve Board. Series (86)is series (84) minus series (85).
(87). General imports. U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign
Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Calendar Year 1940,
p. XII.
(88). Including reexports. Ibid.
(89)-(90). Calendar year totals computed from monthly data, on basis of unrevised
Daily Treasury Statements. 1923-31: successive issues of the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury, 1926-32. 1932: supplied by George C. Haas, U.S.
Treasury Department. 1933-39: Treasury Bulletin, January 1943, March194-6.
Trust accounts are included in 1931 and prior years, excluded thereafter; though
the figures for expenditures for 1932 may not be precisely comparable with figures
for later years. Estimates excluding trust accounts, on which to base relatives for
1937 and 1939 in Table 1, were computed for 1929(receipts, 4115 million dol-
lars; expenditures, 3202 million dollars). Expenditures exclude public debt retire-
ments. Receipts are net of amounts transferred to the federal old-age and sur-
vivors insurance trust fund.
(91). Annual averages computed from end-of-month data based on revised Daily
Treasury Statements, presented in successive issues of the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury, 1936-40. The year-end figures receive a weight of one-
half each in the average for a calendar year.
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